

Problem & Motivation

- **Specification and enforcement of process-level security properties**
- **Main problems:**
 - no native language constructs to model security features in current modeling languages
 - process modeling language different from system modeling language → mapping problem

Systematic Approach

- **CIM: Generic metamodels for process-related security properties**
- **PIM: Domain-specific modeling languages (DSMLs) for process-related security properties**
- **PSM: Enforcement of DSML specifications in software systems**
- **Transformations: CIM-to-PIM mapping (model-to-model) and PIM-to-PSM mapping (model-to-text)**




Figure 1: The approach supports all MDD layers

...
 Definition 3.2: $\forall t_2 \in dme(t_1), pi \in P_i: \forall t_x \in ti(t_2, pi), t_y \in ti(t_1, pi): es(t_x) \cap es(t_y) = \emptyset$
 Definition 3.3: $\forall t_2 \in rb(t_1), pi \in P_i: \forall t_x \in ti(t_2, pi), t_y \in ti(t_1, pi): er(t_x) = er(t_y)$
 Definition 3.4: $\forall t_2 \in sb(t_1), pi \in P_i: \forall t_x \in ti(t_2, pi), t_y \in ti(t_1, pi): es(t_x) = es(t_y)$
 ...

Figure 2: Formal and generic definitions (CIM level)

Example: Secure Object Flows

- **CIM: Generic definition for data confidentiality and integrity**
- **PIM: Integration of secure object flows into the UML**
 - business-level: process view → security-extended UML activity models
 - service-level: SOA views → UML component structure, service activity, and secure invocation protocol
- **PSM: Web Services → WS-BPEL, WSDL, WS-SecurityPolicy**

- **Tool support for**
 - all modeling views (business processes, security properties, software services)
 - automatic model transformations
 - deployment of software artifacts in runtime engine




Figure 3: Integrated tool support for the definition and implementation of secure object flows




Figure 4: Different modeling levels, views, and transformations

References

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