Automated Security Risk Identification Based on Engineering Data



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Matthias Eckhart, Andreas Ekelhart, Edgar Weippl

Background & Motivation

Security by Design for Industry 4.0

Security risk management efforts are vital for adopting a security-enhanced engineering process for cyber-physical systems [4], as security risks need to be addressed in a cost-effective manner.

This requires:

- Integration of security aspects in digitized engineering workflows
- Utilization of existing engineering know-how
- Adoption of the IEC 62443-3-2 [6] for security risk assessments
- Methods to efficiently identify risk sources and attack consequences

Problems

- Existing engineering data formats, such as AutomationML [2], lack semantic modeling concepts for expressing security know-how
- Carrying out security risk assessments according to IEC 62443-3-2 [6] is complex and effortful since tool support is missing
- Identifying and understanding relationships among the detected security risks is difficult [3]

Need: Method that automatically identifies security weaknesses based on engineering data and visualizes their cyber-physical relevance.

Automated Risk Identification Method

Contribution [5]: Provide a method for the automated identification of security risks based on AutomationML engineering artifacts and visualization of threats by means of cyber-physical attack graphs (CPAGs).

Overview

- Risk identification method follows the IEC 62443-3-2 [6]
- Introduction of a security modeling concept named AML sec for the adequate representation of the cyber-physical systems' security properties in AutomationML [2] artifacts
- Knowledge-based approach
- Novel variant of attack graphs that systems integrators can apply to gain insights into possible multistage cyber-physical attacks
- **Open-source prototype:** https://github.com/sbaresearch/amlsec

Ontological Security Modeling

Engineering knowledge present in AutomationML artifact is transformed to OWL



- Conceptual mapping via AutomationML libraries
- Data validation checks via reasoners and SHACL constraints
- ICS security ontology and SHACL shapes comprise security know-how
- Knowledge is interlinked with data from public sources (e.g., CVEs)

Automated Risk Identification

- Based on a combination of SPARQL queries and SHACL constraints
- SPARQL queries check whether zone and conduit requirements as per the IEC 62443-3-2 [6] are met
- Validation rules expose insecure components and configurations
- Interlinked knowledge graph (e.g., CVEs) reveals known vulnerabilities
- Attack consequences are identified by interpreting the semantics of plant components and associating them to assets that are at risk

Figure 1: Overview of our AutomationML-based risk identification method (robot cell illustration taken from [1]).

Cyber-Physical Attack Graphs

A cyber-physical attack graph (CPAG) is a directed vertex- and edgeweighted graph $CPAG = (V, E, \omega_V, \omega_E)$, where V is the finite vertex set of assets, *E* is a multiset of directed edges from $V \times V$ representing vulnerabilities, $\omega_V: V \to S$ is the vertex weight function that maps all vertices according to the assets' cyber-physical criticality onto the set $S, \omega_E: E \rightarrow S$ is the edge weight function that maps all edges according to the vulnerabilities' severity onto the set S, and S = [0, 10].

Conclusion & Outlook

- Method fosters a security-by-design engineering process
- Automated identification of risk sources and attack consequences
- Introduction of security concepts for AutomationML (AMLsec)
- Method seamlessly integrates into the engineering workflow

CPAGs can be automatically generated by means of a SPARQL query. Subsequent pruning increases the utility and usability of CPAGs.

- CPAGs visualize potential multistage cyber-physical attacks that exploit the weaknesses identified in engineering data
- Open-source prototypical implementation of our method exists
- Incorporating COLLADA and PLCOpen XML is worthwhile
- Quantitative analysis capabilities will be added in the future

[1] AutomationML. AutomationML example: Robot cell. Technical report, March 2017.

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