

Contactless Side Channel Based Disassembling

A time shift resilient machine learning approach

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Problem & Motivation

Side Channel Based Disassembling

Refers to the process of recovering the source code running on a device from one of its side channels, e.g., its power consumption or electromagnetic emanation.

This can be divided into two phases:

- **Profiling:** Behaviour of the chosen side channel is learned during execution of corresponding instructions.
- **Attacking:** Unknown instruction traces are reconstructed from side channel leakage.

Problems

Side channel obfuscation is predominantly caused by

- **Non-consecutive execution:** Instruction phases overlap due to processor pipeline.
- **Register value dependencies:** Side channel behaviour depends not only on instruction, but also on register values. [1]
- **Synchronization:** Attacker needs to be in-phase with the target device.
- **Background noise:** Peripherals and other unwanted radiation sources cause interference.

Our Approach

Contribution: We incorporate previously proposed approaches from secret key recovery [2] and image recognition [3] in building an electromagnetic side channel based disassembler with enhanced time shift resilience to eliminate the need for synchronization.

- **Profiling:** To ensure independence of all other factors except the instruction itself, all registers are initialized with random values, and two random instructions are inserted before and after the target instruction, each working with random registers.
- **Data Augmentation:** Several data augmentation methods are evaluated. The following aims to enhance time-shift resilience: Several trace recordings are concatenated; a window of length T and a uniform random offset $T' \in [-\sigma, +\sigma]$ from t_0 cut out.
- **Attacking:** For performance evaluation, random instruction traces are generated and reconstructed.
- **Sliding Window:** A window of length T slides over the full trace using a predefined overlap. The resulting windows are fed into the classifier.
- **Model:** A one-dimensional convolutional neural network similar to the VGG16 implementation is used for classification.




Figure 1: Algorithm schematics and close up visualizations of the preprocessing algorithms

Application

- **Reverse Engineering:** IP theft, localization of critical code segments, code recognition and code flow analysis
- **Monitoring:** Detection of deviations from regular execution, realtime code execution tracking
- **Complex Embedded Systems:** Non-intrusive application to systems that don't allow time synchronization, e.g., programmable logic controllers

Preliminary Conclusions*

- **Complex model architectures** and high computational resources are necessary to cope with side channel obfuscations.
- **Leakage cartography** of local electromagnetic emanations shows high gradient.
- **Promising results** using a reduced instructions set have already been obtained.

*This is a work in progress and final conclusions are to follow.

[1] Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar, and Björn Weghenkel. Building a side channel based disassembler. *Transactions on Computational Science*, 10:78–99, 01 2010.

[2] Eleonora Cagli, Cecile Dumas, and Emmanuel Prouff. Convolutional neural networks with data augmentation against jitter-based countermeasures – profiling attacks without pre-processing –. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/740*, 2017. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/740>.

[3] Joseph Redmon, Santosh Kumar Divvala, Ross B. Girshick, and Ali Farhadi. You only look once: Unified, real-time object detection. *CoRR*, abs/1506.02640, 2015.

[4] Valence Cristiani, Maxime Lecomte, and Thomas Hiscock. A bit-level approach to side channel based disassembling. In Sonia Belaid and Tim Güneysu, editors, *Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications*, pages 143–158, Cham, 2020. Springer International Publishing.