

## Problem & Motivation

Hardware security tokens (e.g., hardware wallets, Yubikeys) help users to keep stored secrets secure. However, recently reported attacks suggest that users cannot take the security guarantees of their devices for granted – even despite widely deployed authenticity checks.

Evaluate the effectiveness and usability of authenticity checks, we present (i) the first comprehensive market review analyzing authenticity checks of popular hardware security token and (ii) a large scale survey investigating user perceptions and usage of these checks.

## Hardware Security Tokens




Figure 1: Simplified Hardware Wallet Transaction Model




Figure 2: Simplified U2F Authentication Model

## Market Review

- ▶ Reviewed tokens:
  - ▷ 4 YubiKey models
  - ▷ 5 hardware wallets
- ▶ Methodology: cognitive walkthroughs

Attestation / Countermeasure	Pkg	Hardware	Attack Vectors											
			Hardware implants	Token replication	IC modification	Firmware modification	USB exploit	Token pre-initialization	Timing side-channels	Bus snooping	IC microprobing	Fault injection		
Pkg	Tamper-evident	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Holographic sticker	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hardware	Single-piece cast	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Openable device	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Secure element (co-processor)	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Software	Secure CPU	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Local firmware validation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Remote firmware attestation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Key attestation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Manual firmware load	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

○ no prevention ● strong protection ● complicates attack/decreases usefulness

Table 1: Evaluation Framework: Mapping of Authenticity Checks to Attack Vectors

## User Survey

- ▶ 2 discussion rounds with:
  - ▷ 9 HW security token users
  - ▷ 3 smartphone users
- ▶ Online questionnaire
  - ▷ 194 participants
  - ▷ 27–30 open/closed questions
  - ▷ 3 user groups: HW-Wallet, YubiKey, Smartphone




Figure 3: Performed Authenticity Checks Based on Self-Reported Data (Selection)

## Conclusion

- ▶ Currently deployed authenticity checks—even in best-case implementations—are not sufficient to defeat all distribution attacks.
- ▶ Users incorrectly assess the existence and the security guarantees of many authenticity checks due to a lack of information and visibility.
- ▶ Recommendation: A combination of (i) secure CPUs or elements, (ii) remote firmware attestation, (iii) a recently proposed method for collaborative and verifiable key generation, and (iv) a user-friendly transparent design.